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Evil: A History, edited by Andrew P. Chignell. Oxford University Press, 
2019. Pp. xxiv + 499. $36.95 (paperback).
J. L. AIJIAN, Biola University
In the words of Martin Luther King Jr., “There is something wrong with 
our world, something fundamentally and basically wrong” (Martin Luther 
King Jr., Rediscovering Lost Values (given at Second Baptist Church, Detroit, 
1945)). This claim may seem glaringly obvious, especially coming from 
someone like Dr. King who lived and died trying to change it. But the fact 
that there is something wrong with the world, and that we know it, creates 
no end of philosophical puzzles. Some are theological: If a good God created 
the world, why wasn’t he able to make a better one than this? Shouldn’t he be held 
responsible for anything bad that happens as a result of his design? Some are 
rational: If evil actions involve knowingly choosing the worse (as opposed to sim-
ply making an error), then why would a rational human ever do an evil action? Is 
the choice to do evil fundamentally unintelligible? Some are epistemic: If this is 
the only world anyone has ever experienced, and it’s always been like this, how is 
it possible that we all take the measure of this world and find it wanting?
Each of these questions is taken up in Evil: A History, a new volume in 
the Oxford Philosophical Concepts series which has set itself the ambi-
tious task of “bring[ing] together eminent international scholars to exca-
vate the sources of prominent philosophical concepts and explore their 
histories” (Christina Mercer, Series Preface (Oxford University Press)). 
Among the other volumes in the series are books dedicated to the con-
cepts of Animals, Dignity, Embodiment, Efficient Causation, and Eternity. 
Christina Mercer, the series editor, describes its aim as partially storytelling 
and partially conceptual analysis, revealing the “twists and turns” in the 
development of a crucial philosophical concept, and making that history 
available to “anyone interested in philosophy” (Christina Mercer, Series 
Preface (Oxford University Press)). The volumes are intended to make a 
philosophical tradition accessible to the lay reader, and also enliven the 
contemporary discussion among philosophers by encouraging them to 
“move beyond the borders of their discipline” by considering their topics 
in light of their larger, interdisciplinary context (Christina Mercer, “Series 
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Editor’s Foreword,” Evil: A History (Oxford University Press, 2019), xii). 
This encouragement is meant to come in the form of reflections inter-
spersed between the chapters, in which a piece of art (musical, visual, 
poetic) is examined, and its contribution to the concept articulated.
In her introduction, Mercer explains a central premise of the series: that 
each of these concepts originates in an attempt to solve a human problem. 
The story of a shifting concept is the story of a shifting strategy to account 
for that problem. In Chignell’s introduction, he gives his own take on what 
problem the concept “evil” is trying to solve: “chaos, suffering and ruin,” 
(Andrew P. Chignell, “Introduction,” Evil: A History (Oxford University 
Press, 2019), xiii). He counts among humanity’s attempts to reckon with 
this problem ceremonies, myths, sacred texts, epic poems, and of course, 
philosophical accounts of evil. Chignell is almost apologetic about the 
term “evil,” which he recognizes has an arcane and magical flavor in con-
temporary discussion (except in politicized public discourse). Usually, 
when we use the term “evil” today, we mean nothing more than espe-
cially bad human behavior, but this meaning creates problems. Primarily, 
it creates the tendency to “sensationalize” evil by making it the exclusive 
purview of moral monsters. One of the benefits of this volume’s approach 
is that it reveals how historically unusual our contemporary account of 
“evil” is. The journey of this text is a journey into evil, not as a term of 
condemnation for an enemy, but as a way of naming something we each 
find in ourselves.
In keeping with the series’ premise (that philosophical concepts shift 
according to shifting strategies to solve a human problem), the chapters 
in the volume proceed in a largely chronological way, beginning with an 
attempt to trace the etymology of the word “evil” back to its earliest roots. 
The account then proceeds to Hebrew understandings of evil, highlight-
ing the comparatively chaotic and ambivalent character of evil in this 
tradition. The volume moves very quickly through Greek and Roman con-
ceptions into an emphasis on Augustine’s privation theory, which bridges 
the gap into a sustained examination of the Medieval period. This section 
touches on traditional Western figures like Aquinas and Dante alongside 
others including women mystics and al-Ghazālī. As the volume moves into 
the Modern period, the focus is on Kant, with flanking essays outlining 
the secularization and de-mystification of the concept of evil that occurs 
during the enlightenment. The final movement outlines how Darwinism 
and Nazism have complicated that enlightenment account, with a final 
contemporary piece on Google’s infamous corporate motto “Don’t Be 
Evil.” The volume lives up to the series’ promise to bring together emi-
nent scholars, with contributions from Peter King, Susan Neiman, Brian 
Davies, and Eleanor Stump among its very distinguished list of authors 
(Chignell also gives credit to Marilyn McCord Adams, who was involved 
in the early stages of the project before she passed).
In practice, the contributions to Evil: A History can be broken into roughly 
four genres. The first are anchoring chapters in which an established 
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expert gives a general introduction to a thinker or topic. A paradigmatic 
example of this is Peter King’s chapter on Augustine’s concept of evil. 
These chapters do not, in general, advance original arguments, but rather 
draw on a scholar’s long familiarity to give a cogent explanation of a major 
thinker’s view. The quality of these chapters is generally very high, and it 
would be easy to imagine them serving as helpful assigned readings for 
an undergraduate course. The one exception I would note is Allan Wood’s 
chapter, in which he allows a disagreement with Kierkegaard to rather 
get the better of him, concluding that, “every sensible person knows that 
irrational religious fanaticism (by which he means Kierkegaard’s account 
in Sickness Unto Death) belongs to the worst and most desperate forms of 
evil, as well as the most common and contemptible, that human beings 
have ever devised” (349). In conjunction with the anchoring chapters are 
others in which an author advances an original claim. In these chapters 
the advancement of the concept of evil is more of an aside to the main 
project of the author’s argument. While some of these chapters are very 
readable, they tend to vary more in quality than the anchoring chapters.
Among the “Reflections,” a few are close reads of artistic works (as 
Mercer envisions), but far more are short-form thought projects on 
extremely diverse topics, from Kant’s account of radical evil to the ethics 
of eating meat. At times these short pieces act as helpful palate cleans-
ers, but writing a meaningful contribution in five pages is a desperately 
tricky business, and in most cases the argument comes off as unconvinc-
ing because the claims cannot be substantiated in such a short piece. In 
other cases, as with Eleanor Stump’s luminous piece on Dante’s Divine 
Comedy, the reader simply feels distraught that the author wasn’t given 
more space to proceed.
Conceptually, the volume centers on two figures. The first is Hannah 
Arendt (especially as she figures into the work of Susan Neiman). The 
book begins and ends with Arendt’s famous characterization of evil 
as banal, a description she gives in an attempt to make sense of Adolf 
Eichmann, who presents a paradox for the modern sense of evil. Here 
is a man who, to all appearances, is profoundly unremarkable. He is a 
competent middle-manager who does his work efficiently with the aim of 
earning a promotion, and the effect of his efficiency is genocide. Eichmann 
is the perfect test case for the relationship between intentional and con-
sequentialist accounts. If we were tempted to think that evil (i.e., super-
latively bad) actions are always precipitated by evil (i.e., superlatively 
malicious) actors, Eichmann serves as proof to the contrary, and forces us 
to choose which of these definitions to prioritize. He problematizes the 
“exoticizing” of evil that our present definition of evil (i.e., the superla-
tively bad) tends to create. He is also the place where metaphysical and 
moral problems of evil come apart.
Various authors discuss Arendt, some taking issue with her account of 
Eichmann and others discussing Jasper’s response, but the use of Arendt 
that gets the most attention is Susan Neiman’s. For Neiman, the question 
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of evil is a question of the basic comprehensibility of the universe. Carol 
Newsom makes this distinction in contrasting Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. 
In Proverbs, the righteous prosper and the wicked suffer. The world makes 
sense and our path within it is clear. In Ecclesiastes, it turns out that our 
rational expectation (that good ends can be achieved through wisdom or 
righteousness) is a fundamental mismatch with the world as it is. Thus, 
evil undermines our trust in the world. It’s in this context that Newsom 
quotes Neiman:
To call evil banal is to offer not a definition of it but a theodicy. For it implies 
that the sources of evil are not mysterious or profound but fully within 
our grasp. If so, they do not infect the world at a depth that could make 
us despair of the world itself. Like a fungus, they may devastate reality by 
laying waste to its surface. Their roots, however, are shallow enough to pull 
up (Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought [Princeton Classics, 2015], 303).
Part of what makes us feel at home in the world is our belief that everyone 
is, at heart, trying to do good and be happy, and that if we do well we will 
generally prosper. Encounters with evil, as in Rachana Kamtekar’s essay 
on Medea, shake that fundamental faith in the comprehensibility of the 
world. So, discovering that one of the masterminds of the Holocaust is not 
a moral monster, but simply an ambitious and shortsighted bureaucrat, 
helps to right the world for us again. Gravity hasn’t been suspended. This 
account also has the advantage of not letting me off the hook for my own 
actions. If evil is banal (i.e., not superlative or extraordinary), then I don’t 
have the luxury of thinking I am not implicated. If I am not so very differ-
ent from Eichmann at heart, this should serve as a warning to me.
It’s in this context that the second dominant figure in the volume, 
Augustine, comes into play. The shadow that Augustine’s privation the-
ory casts over the history of this concept, and over this volume, is remark-
able. Beginning with O’Meara’s chapter on Plotinus and continuing clean 
through to Allan Wood’s chapter on Kant, every figure discussed is either 
looking toward, reacting against, or building on Augustine. The question, 
beginning in Peter King’s masterful essay and continuing throughout the 
medieval and modern sections, is whether we can accept Augustine’s 
response. Does the freedom of the will really make sense of the suffering 
of innocents, of the condemnation of sinners to hell? Has Augustine given 
us a story that makes sense of evil, both within the individual and in the 
world? King argues yes to the first, and no to the second. Free will, as 
Augustine conceives it, gives an account that makes rational agents by 
nature capable of choosing the wrong. When they do so, like Medea, they 
will be able to give a rationalization (in the sense that they will be able 
to give an account of what factors led to their decision), but these factors 
were not and will never be determinative of the will. The choice to do evil 
is the free choice to prefer the worse.
This distinction between rationalizations and reasons gives Augustine 
an escape from the alienating quality of evil that troubles Chignell and 
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others. It also coheres surprisingly well with Kant’s formulation of “rad-
ical evil” as represented by Wood. Evil choices aren’t simply errors (as 
Plato might have it), but neither are they total breaks from human nature 
as we understand it (i.e., wanting bad for itself). Rather, evil choices repre-
sent the human will intentionally and perversely choosing a worse good 
over a better, because it is more appealing to us at the moment. Augustine 
would rather party with his friends than treat his neighbor’s pears with 
the respect they deserve. Medea would rather make Jason suffer than live 
humiliated. Eichmann (perhaps) would rather get a promotion than try to 
stop the Nazis. Each one rationalizes an action while knowing it is worse, 
but none of them is fundamentally incomprehensible to us. Each is bad, 
but none are monsters.
While this account of evil seems to be the likeliest attempt to explain 
moral evils, however, King’s estimation is that it does not explain nat-
ural or metaphysical evil, and this is the other thread that runs consist-
ently through the volume. Perhaps we do suffer as a result of our own free 
choices, but what about all the other suffering that exists in the world? 
What can account for the suffering of animals, for natural disasters, and in 
particular why would a good God (if one exists) allow these? One of the 
most interesting contributions on this topic is Brian Davies’s chapter on 
Aquinas, in which he argues that the Humean accusation that monothe-
ism cannot account for natural evil is actually nonsensical in a Thomistic 
framework. This is because God’s goodness is not moral goodness, and 
cannot be, and so holding God morally responsible for evil simply isn’t 
an option.
In a volume like this, lacunae are inevitable. But there are only a few 
that genuinely impoverish the story Chignell is telling. The first is the fail-
ure to address how the rise of utilitarianism has altered our conception 
of good and bad, and thus our conception of evil. The fallout from this 
shift (in which good and bad are identified with pleasure and pain) is 
visible everywhere in the later parts of the volume, but its source in Mill 
is never named. The second is the choice to include virtually no literature, 
either in the major chapters or the reflections. The importance of Milton, 
Shakespeare, and Dostoevsky to Western thinking about evil is difficult to 
overstate, and to omit them (or in the case of Dante, limit the discussion 
to a short reflection) undermines the stated goals of the volume. If philos-
ophers are to be encouraged to think outside their discipline in order to 
enrich their work, surely a full-length chapter on Dante’s Comedy or on 
Milton’s Satan would fit the bill better than a reflection on Google’s corpo-
rate motto. Moreover, relegating discussion of artistic works to reflections 
can carry the implication that while the chapters are serious scholarly work, 
the reflections are asides or diversions, and this does a disservice to the lit-
erary works, undergirded by deep theological and philosophical acumen, 
that shaped Western thinking on evil.
On the whole, however, Chignell has put together a volume with a 
surprising degree of coherence, full of pieces that are both readable and 
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thoughtful. The aim at making a volume accessible to the lay reader gen-
erally hits his mark: the tone of the major pieces is refreshingly casual, and 
often funny. Further, the story that the volume tells as a whole is informa-
tive and interesting, an extremely challenging mark to hit when collecting 
essays from diverse authors. In taking such a wide scope, it gives both 
beginners and experts food for thought. In a discipline that too often falls 
prey to silos and narrow questions, this series and this volume are wel-
come additions.
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Intellectual, Humanist and Religious Commitment: Acts of Assent, by Peter 
Forrest. Bloomsbury Academic. 2019. Pp. 208. $153 (hardcover).
BRENDAN SWEETMAN, Rockhurst University
When I was an undergraduate in Dublin studying the philosophy of reli-
gion, there was a student who would constantly invent radical views of 
God and creation in order to show that we could go beyond traditional 
accounts, solve stubborn problems along the way, and still arrive at an 
outlook that was plausible and defensible. Over tea and doughnuts, we 
argued fiercely about whether his strange views were (refreshingly!) origi-
nal and plausible, or outrageous speculations that served only to stimulate 
reflection about the nature of God and creation. The present book may be 
regarded as an extremely sophisticated version of this approach. Building 
upon Forrest’s earlier work, this study is an addition to the recent litera-
ture on fideism that we have seen in such thinkers as John Leslie and John 
Bishop, whose work follows the general approach of William James.
Forrest’s argument throughout is intricate and involved; there are lots 
of pieces, many of which (as he admits) can be described as speculations 
that are not very well developed, and, we must add, not convincingly 
defended. Nevertheless, the book exhibits complex philosophizing and 
clever insights, and offers what some will see as an intriguing set of sug-
gestions with regard to perennial issues. The author’s approach is a kind 
of hybrid of contemporary analytic philosophy and process philosophy, 
especially in the conception of God that emerges from these pages, for 
he suggests that initially god does not have a moral character but even-
tually develops into a being worthy of worship and so becomes God. In 
Chapters 1 and 2, Forrest starts from the position that he believes afflicts 
the modern intellectual world—the loss of “epistemic innocence,” where 
innocence refers to the state of believing without critical reflection. In 
